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This publication is a product of the South Asia Poverty Reduction and Economic 
Management Unit.  It is part of a larger effort by the World Bank to provide open access to its 
research and make a contribution to development policy discussions in Pakistan and around 
the world. Policy Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. 
The authors may be contacted at sahmed20@worldbank.org and mgautam@worldbank.org. 
  
Abstract 
 
This paper reviews Pakistan’s agriculture performance and analyzes its agriculture and water 
policies. It discusses the nature of rural poverty and emphasizes the reasons why agricultural 
growth is a critical component to any pro-poor growth strategy for Pakistan. It supports 
these arguments by summarizing key results from recent empirical analysis where the 
relative benefits of agricultural versus non-agricultural led growth are examined. The results 
also provide an illustration of farm and non-farm linkages. It summarizes recent 
performance of the agriculture sector, and discusses key characteristics of its sluggish 
productivity growth. Three key issues related to increasing productivity are discussed: 
namely technology, water use and water management, and policy reforms related to markets 
and trade that can strengthen the enabling environment and contribute to the promotion of 
diversification towards high value agriculture 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to 
encourage the exchange of ideas about development issues. An objective of the series is to get 
the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers 
carry the names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, 
interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those of the authors. 
They do not necessarily represent the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development / World Bank and its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive 
Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent. 
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Executive Summary 
 
1. Pakistan’s economy has grown substantially over the past decade, with an average 
real GDP growth rate of about 4.9 percent per year. Growth in agricultural value added has 
been lower at 3.3 percent per year. As is the case in transforming economies, the transition 
from an agrarian economy to a developed economy is accompanied by a decline in the share 
of primary agriculture with a commensurate increase in the share of manufacturing and 
services. Pakistan has also experienced this trend, with the share of agriculture value added 
in real GDP declining from 46 percent in 1960 to 26 percent in 2000 and 21 percent in 2010 
(World Bank, 2011a).  
 
2. Nevertheless, the agricultural sector is important for inclusive growth. Only 17.5 
percent of the poor are in urban areas, with the remainder representing a range of different 
rural households. 39 percent of the poor are rural non-farm income dependent households, 
9.7 percent are from households of landless farmers, 11.8 percent are from households of 
agricultural wage laborers, 20.1 percent are small farm households, and 1.9 percent of the 
poor coming from medium to large farm households. The performance of the agricultural 
sector also has a strong impact on non-farm activity growth in reducing poverty. Studies of 
growth linkages have suggested that non-farm incomes rise by an additional 0.35 to 0.85 
dollars for every dollar increase in agricultural income (Haggblade et al., 1991; Hazell et al., 
2012). 
 
3. While Pakistan’s poverty rate has continued to fall over the decade, agriculture’s poor 
performance in recent years has limited its contributions to poverty reduction. The 
percentage of the population below the national poverty line declined from 34.7 percent to 
21.9 percent between 2001-02 and 2005-06, and this declining trend continued till 2007-08 
to 17.2 percent (World Bank, 2012a). Of the 12.8 percentage point decline in the poverty 
headcount ratio between 2001-02 and 2005-06, growth in farm income accounted for 2.8 
percentage points (Inchauste and Winkler, 2012). When the poverty reduction between 
2001-02 and 2007-08 is considered, farm income growth was responsible for 3.2 percentage 
points of the reduction.  
 
4. Economy wide modeling work by IFPRI (2012) suggests that there is potential for 
agriculture-led growth to be more poverty reducing than non-agriculture-led growth. An 
economic growth strategy focusing on TFP growth in crop and livestock sectors is found to be 
more inclusive than a strategy targeting TFP growth in industry or services alone. 
Households that depend on agricultural wages do almost as well as in any other scenario. A 
livestock focused growth strategy tends to benefit households with large farms. In contrast, 
growth led by productivity improvements in services appears to be harmful to incomes for 
rural households that do not own farms. To put these in context, note that less than 2 
percent of the poor are from medium to large farm households, while rural non-farm 
households and rural households involved in agriculture represent 39 percent and 42 
percent of the poor, respectively. 
 
5. A strategy to promote broad based agricultural growth can directly improve 
agricultural incomes (especially among the landless and smallholder farmers) by narrowing 
the wide yield gaps that currently exist and by diversifying towards high-value agricultural 
products. The Planning Commission (2009) estimates that average yields tend to be far 
below the Progressive Farmer yields that represent the achievable upper bound. The national 
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average yields of major crops like wheat and rice are currently only about 55 percent of 
Progressive Farmer yields, which represent the highest achievable yields in Pakistan. These 
yield gaps are even greater for some commercial crops like sugarcane in Sindh (73 percent). 
Despite the large potential for improvement, yield growth has been steadily declining over 
the years. For example, rice yields grew at an average annual rate of 5.24 percent in 1960s 
and 3.16 percent in 1990s, whereas they have only been growing at 1.68 percent per year this 
past decade. A similar pattern can be seen in the case of wheat, which had average annual 
yield growth of 2.92 percent in 1960s and 1.99 percent in 1990s. This growth rate is now only 
1.1 percent per year. 
 
6. Pakistan’s agricultural output growth rate has been decelerating, and is reflected in 
its declining TFP growth rate. In earlier decades, Pakistan’s average annual output growth 
rate was as high as 4.8 percent (in the 80s), making it a global leader in agricultural growth. 
In the past decade, however, agricultural output growth rate has shrunk to a more modest 
3.34 percent. In earlier decades, Pakistan’s TFP growth was responsible for a substantial 
share of the output growth. For example, in the 1960s, 1980s, and 1990s TFP accounted for 
44 percent, 67 percent, and 37 percent, respectively, of the output growth. In contrast, TFP 
now accounts for less than a fifth of the output growth. Relative to other countries, 
agricultural TFP growth since the 1990s has been very slow, but has mildly picked up more 
recently. Pakistan’s TFP growth has gone from being among the best in the world in the 
1980s to being the lowest among regional and Asian comparators (Bangladesh, India, Sri 
Lanka, and China). 
 
7. Closing current yield gaps are also the best strategy to adapt to climate change, which 
is expected to put additional stress on the agriculture sector. Yu et al. (2012) consider a range 
of climate change scenarios to estimate impacts on the economy. Production impacts in the 
crop sub-sector vary by crop and region. Crop production declines are greatest in Sindh, 
where it declines by 10 percent on average. In the most extreme case, Sindh’s crop 
production shrinks by 36 percent. In contrast, Punjab’s crop production shrinks by only 5 
percent in the worst case scenario. Yu et al. (2012) estimate that if crop yields were to 
improve by 20 percent over the next two decades, then GDP, agricultural GDP, and 
household incomes would rise by 2.6 percent, 11.6 percent, and 3.4 percent, respectively, 
more than compensating for the effects of climate change. Furthermore, the 20 percent yield 
improvement over 20 years is a realistic goal, given that wheat and rice yields improved by 1-
2 percent per year over the 1989-99 period. Even after a 20 percent improvement in wheat 
and rice yields, there would still be a substantial yield gap between the average achieved yield 
and what is currently achievable in the best case scenario. 
 
8. Much of the high historical growth in yields and productivity can be attributed to 
major scientific breakthroughs in technology, as during the Green Revolution, resulting from 
the investments in agricultural research undertaken by the national agricultural research 
system. Agricultural R&D in Pakistan has historically been led by the public sector, and has 
proven to be a good investment. Estimated internal rates of return from investments in 
agricultural research have ranged between 57 percent to 65 percent, with most of the returns 
coming from Green Revolution research. However, there are severe technical capacity 
constraints to the current agricultural research system. According to ASTI data, public 
investment in agricultural research has been on the decline. It is currently about 0.21 percent 
of agricultural GDP and ranks at the bottom of agricultural R&D spending as a share of 
agricultural GDP in the region. Only 15 percent of agricultural research staff trained holds 
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PhDs, which is low relative to the educational attainment of researchers in the rest of South 
Asia (Beintema et al. 2007). Qualified research staff is discouraged from public research 
agencies due to institutional disincentives such as limited promotion opportunities and low 
salaries. 
 
9. The technical capacity constraints are compounded by inefficiencies generated by the 
institutional environment. The Pakistan Agricultural Research Council (PARC) coordinates 
the activities of a large agricultural research network of public national and provincial 
agricultural research bodies, institutes and experimental stations. PARC does not conduct 
agricultural research itself although the National Agricultural Research Center is under its 
administration. With the passing of the 18th Amendment to the Constitution, the public 
agricultural system has now devolved from the federal to the provincial level, allowing 
research to have a greater focus on the needs of local farmers and environmental conditions.  
 
10. In addition to technology, a critical factor in improving the crop yields is water 
availability and the performance of the irrigation system. About 95 percent of Pakistan’s 
arable land is currently irrigated, up from 64 percent in 1960 and 72 percent in 1980. 
However, farmers’ access to water is less than it could be due to major limitations of the 
water allocation system. At the farm level, access to canal water is determined by physical 
location along the canal and through the warabandi water allocation system of 
administratively set rotations. Access to canal water then becomes contingent on access to 
land, and the location of that land. There might not be enough water by the time it gets to 
land at the tail end of distributaries or watercourses, especially if upstream farmers have 
illegally access to water (Yu et al., 2012). 
 
11. Another critical challenge to the irrigation system under the current water 
management system is that it is financially unsustainable. The canal irrigation management 
system recovers only a quarter of its annual operating and maintenance costs, with the 
shortfall expected to increase with rising costs and stagnant Abiana (water charges per acre 
of crops irrigated) (Planning Commission, 2012). The collection rate of assessed Abiana is 
also low—at only 60 percent of assessed values—and the resulting budget gap is about Rs. 5.4 
billion annually. The system is thus subsidized by the federal government. The current 
Abiana for different crops might also be distorting farmer decisions, since they do not reflect 
the relative profitability of each crop. For example, comparing the Abiana for rice and 
cotton—two major export crops—it can be seen that their irrigation charges per acre are 
about the same, even though rice requires 60 percent more water than cotton. There might 
thus be possible overproduction of rice. 
 
12. Recognizing the importance of a robust and efficient water management system, the 
Government of Pakistan implemented reforms in the 1990s to enhance water use efficiency, 
streamline water resources management, and facilitate participation by users. However, the 
reforms have not been completely successful. At the provincial level, the devolution of 
autonomy from the Public Irrigation Departments (PIDs) to Provincial Irrigation and 
Drainage Authorities (PIDAs) is incomplete, with the PIDs maintaining managerial control 
over the PIDAs through a range of mechanisms. At the local level, Farmers’ Organizations 
(FOs) that are meant to help manage distributor and minor canals have no input into the 
Abiana setting process. FOs also vary widely in their role as charge collectors, since charges 
are set by management and the FOs may or may not have any voice in this process. The lack 
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of clarity in the role and mandate of the FOs has contributed to the inefficiencies in Abiana 
collection that are damaging the financial sustainability of the system. 
 
13. The irrigation system is highly inefficient as is demonstrated by the substantial 
seepage losses which occur in almost every component of the delivery system. The overall 
efficiency of the system is 35 percent, and improving the canal system’s efficiency from 35 
percent to 50 percent could boost growth substantially. Yu et al. (2012) estimated that GDP 
and GDP from the agriculture sector would decline by 1.1 percent and 5.1 percent on average, 
under climate change. Even modest improvement to the canal system’s efficiency would 
increase GDP by 0.94 percent and agricultural GDP by 4.22 percent, on average. 
 
14. Another limitation to water access is at the provincial level due to institutional 
features such as the 1991 Provincial Water Allocation Accord. Since 1991, water inflows have 
been apportioned among the provinces by the Indus Water Accord, allocating flows among 
the provinces based on a 5-year record of pre-Accord historical canal diversions. Relaxation 
of the institutional rigidities of the Accord can allow for a more market-based allocation of 
water leading to aggregate economic benefits. Yu et al. (2012) estimate that by relaxing the 
allocation constraints of the Accord, Punjab and Sindh would gain Rs. 83 billion and Rs. 82 
billion in revenue, respectively, although other provinces would collectively lose about Rs. 7 
billion. Relaxing the conditions of the Accord by itself, without complementary policy may 
thus lead to outcomes that are not necessarily pro-poor. The complementary policy would 
need to compensate groups that the Accord relaxation would harm, such as farmers in 
Baluchistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, or producers of crops that are not irrigated.  
 
15. International and domestic trade are critical to improving agricultural production, 
but face challenges to their growth. Agricultural exports directly account for more than 11 
percent of Pakistan’s exports, with exports of downstream industries like textiles accounting 
for more than another 40 percent of export revenue (Planning Commission, 2009).  
 
16. However, policies introduced in the past five years have steadily eroded the effects of 
trade liberalization that Pakistan implemented between 1996 and 2003. Pakistan had 
simplified its tariff structure and state trading monopolies for agricultural products had been 
abolished. However, exceptions were introduced in 2006, and a number of the more 
important reforms in agriculture were reversed, especially with regard to wheat, sugar and 
fertilizer. The use of SROs (Statutory Regulatory Orders) has also expanded since 2006. 
SROs and new regulatory duties have been used to provide exemptions to normal tariffs in 
some cases, while increasing tariffs for others. The resulting trade regime is thus highly 
discretionary and uncertain, leading to significant and unpredictable output and input price 
distortions. 
 
17. Major crops like wheat, rice, sugar, and cotton are implicitly taxed by various policy 
induced price distortions introduced in most years. The implicit tax on crop production 
depresses production despite implicit net input subsidies. For example, basmati rice had 
negative ERPs between 2008 and 2010, when farm income would have been higher by 21 
percent to 40 percent under a no-intervention regime. The case of sugar also illustrates the 
same. The significant increase in the world price of refined sugar raised the parity price, but 
the increase in general sales tax applied to sugar offset the higher border prices. Sugar’s 
parity prices are thus approximately double the observed farm gate price discouraging 
production.  
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18. The benefits of some domestic trade policies have also been unclear, as is illustrated 
by the public procurement of wheat. Government procurement of wheat is extensive, and 
involves federal, provincial and district level agencies. The government sets the procurement 
price with expected procurement targets that the Pakistan Agricultural Storage and Services 
Corporation (PASSCO) and Provincial Food Departments are responsible for meeting. 
Provincial governments (mainly Punjab and Sindh) and PASSCO procure about 20 percent 
of total wheat production each year (Prikhodko and Zrilyi, 2012).  All procured wheat is then 
sold to flour millers in the same wheat marketing year, with the government absorbing the 
costs of procurement, storage, and financing. Millers are able to buy the subsidized wheat at 
below market prices, and then sell the flour at open market prices, which are the prices faced 
by consumers. This price stabilization role is perhaps one reason that wheat stocks have 
risen in the recent past, which has led to exports at subsidized prices in years of high wheat 
production. 
 
19. The impact of these procurement policies on consumer welfare needs to be carefully 
analyzed. On the one hand the wheat market interventions have insulated the domestic 
market from global price volatility, but the rise in real prices of wheat over time has likely 
hurt net buyers while benefiting the net-sellers.  Furthermore, the market intervention is 
often fiscally costly and can also lead to perverse outcomes like subsidized exports. 
 
20. There is substantial scope for accelerating broad-based agricultural growth to fully 
exploit its potential for poverty reduction.  To achieve this, policy actions are required to 
promote technology and innovation, improve water use management and put in place the 
right trade policies.  
 
1. Technology and innovation are critical to improve agricultural productivity. Key 
actions required for this are substantial reforms to the current national agricultural 
research system. First, the system requires fundamental institutional reforms to 
make it more efficient and effective. With efforts under way to develop provincial 
agricultural research institutions, the role of PARC and the NARC needs to be 
adjusted to exploit their comparative advantage of being federal institutions able to 
facilitate federal funding, intra-provincial knowledge, and capacity building. Second, 
with the shift in primary activities from the federal to the provincial levels and from 
policy coordination to agricultural research, then there is a need to reflect these 
activities human resource and performance incentives. This may require moving 
personnel from the center to the provincial institutions, or even changing the 
composition of the staff, to increase the percentage of scientific research staff for 
example. Third, these reforms will require additional spending in agricultural 
research and development, whether for supporting agricultural research in provincial 
research centers or capacity building of science staff, with the exact composition of 
additional spending depending on the nature of the institutional reforms. 
 
2. To improve water use efficiency, the most important intervention would be 
institutional reform of the entire management system. Given the system’s high 
dysfunction, clarifying the institutional environment would be a prerequisite for any 
other intervention under consideration, such as revising the Abiana. The reforms to 
the water management system include completely devolving authority to the relevant 
scale, clarifying the roles and mandates of each authority, and providing sufficient 
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resources and capacity building to allow the devolved authorities to fulfill their 
mandates. 
 
3. To improve international trade of agricultural products, the trade regime must be 
simplified. This will require removing unpredictable and discretionary instruments 
like SROs, shifting to a lower set of uniform tariffs, and simplifying the trade regime 
by removing alternative trade policy instruments like export taxes. These would 
reduce uncertainty, volatility, and the policy bias against agricultural products like 
rice and sugar. From a practical perspective, the reforms will require the 
identification of a realistic timetable for reform, as well as the identification of WTO 
compliant instruments that may still be appropriate to protect national interests. 
 
4. To improve domestic trade of agricultural products while protecting food security, 
distortions in domestic markets of commodities like wheat need to be removed. The 
simplest set of reforms would be to reduce the wheat procurement volume, while 
designing and implementing complementary social safety net programs. The wheat 
procurement contraction would reduce the effective subsidy to wheat producers and 
decrease the fiscal burden. If food price stability is important, price bands can be 
implemented using rules-based adjustable tariffs that set floor and ceiling prices to 
follow world prices. In parallel, social safety net programs that target food insecure 
groups can be established, with the programs having clearly defined triggers and 
graduation requirements.  
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Introduction 
 
21. Pakistan’s economy has grown substantially over the past decade with an average real 
GDP growth rate of about 4.9 percent per year between 2000 and 2010, while agricultural 
value added has grown at a lower rate of 3.3 percent per year (World Bank, 2011a). As is the 
case in transforming economies, the transition from an agrarian economy to a developed 
economy is accompanied by a decline in the share of primary agriculture with a 
commensurate increase in the share of manufacturing and services. Pakistan has also 
experienced this trend, with the share of agriculture value added in real GDP declining from 
46 percent in 1960 to 26 percent in 2000 and 21 percent in 2010 (World Bank, 2011a). 
 
22. Nevertheless, agriculture remains a socio-economically and politically important 
sector at the current stage of Pakistan’s transformation process. Agriculture accounts for 
more than 40 percent of total employment1 (World Bank, 2011a), though the sector’s 
contribution to overall employment is likely to be much higher considering downstream 
activities through supply chains, transportation, and the processing sectors it contributes to. 
Agriculture also contributes substantially both directly and indirectly to foreign exchange 
revenue. Agricultural exports directly account for more than 11 percent of Pakistan’s exports, 
with exports of downstream industries like textiles accounting for more than another 40 
percent of export revenue2.  
 
23. Historically, the sector has done well at the national level due to technologies of 
Green Revolution. A combination of expanded input use, investments in land and water 
resources, and rapid improvements in total factor productivity over the years have been the 
main sources of past growth. The slowdown since 1995, however, is a cause for concern. This 
is of particular importance going forward because global markets have become much more 
unreliable (with high and volatile prices), resource degradation (of soil and water in 
particular) has increased, and the uncertainty associated with the impact of climate change 
on agricultural production poses a serious threat to food security. Pakistan has made 
substantial progress in reducing food insecurity, most recently illustrated by the recent 
downgrading of its status from ‘Alarming’ to ‘Serious’ in the Global Hunger Index3 (IFPRI, 
2011). Yet, substantial food and nutrition security challenges remain. For example, 26 
percent of the population is estimated to be undernourished, with the rate of 
undernourishment higher among children at 38 percent (Food Security Portal, 2012). 
 
24. While Pakistan’s poverty rate has continued to fall over this period, agriculture’s 
sluggish performance in recent years has limited its contributions to poverty reduction. The 
percentage of the population below the national poverty line declined from 34.7 percent to 
21.9 percent between 2001-02 and 2005-06, and this declining trend continued till 2007-08 
to 17.2 percent (World Bank, 2012a)4. Of the 12.8 percentage point decline in the poverty 
                                                          
1 Employment in agriculture as a share of total employment was 44 percent in 2008 (World Bank, 2011a) 
2 Based on data for 2006-07 from Planning Commission (2009) 
3 The GHI is a weighted index based on the proportion of undernourished as a percentage of the population, the 
prevalence of underweight children under the age of five; and the mortality rate of children under the age of five. 
4 The poverty headcount rates at the national poverty line are very similar to the poverty headcount rates 
measured at the $1.25 a day (PPP) poverty line. For example, the poverty rate was 35.87 percent in 2002 and 21.4 
percent in 2008 at the $1.25 a day line, versus 34.7 percent and 17.2 percent at the national poverty line (World 
Bank, 2011a). Poverty rates are substantially higher when the $2 a day (PPP) poverty line is considered, with 
poverty rates of 73.9 percent in 2002 and 60.2 percent in 2008. 
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headcount ratio between 2001-02 and 2005-06, growth in farm income accounted for 2.8 
percentage points (Inchauste and Winkler, 2012). When the poverty reduction between 
2001-02 and 2007-08 is considered, farm income growth was responsible for 3.2 percentage 
points of the reduction.  
 
25. Robust growth of the agricultural sector as part of a broader strategy that enhances 
both farm and non-farm income and employment is imperative for inclusive, pro-poor 
growth. The performance of the agricultural sector also has a strong impact on the ability of 
non-farm activity growth in reducing poverty. So, if the local economy is growing slowly, this 
will be reflected in the non-farm sector’s growth. Rural non-farm activities also tend to be 
closely related to the agricultural sector at lower-income levels, since higher agricultural 
incomes would translate into higher spending on local non-farm goods and services. Studies 
of growth linkages have suggested that non-farm incomes rise by an additional 0.35 to 0.85 
dollars for every dollar increase in agricultural income (Haggblade et al., 1991; Hazell et al., 
2012). 
 
26. This paper reviews some of the key issues to stimulate such growth. The paper 
discusses rural poverty in more detail, and emphasizes the reasons why agricultural growth 
is a critical component to any pro-poor growth strategy in Pakistan. It supports these 
arguments by summarizing key results from recent empirical analysis where the relative 
benefits of agricultural versus non-agricultural led growth are examined. The results also 
provide an illustration of farm and non-farm linkages. It then summarizes recent 
performance of the agriculture sector, and discusses key characteristics of its sluggish 
productivity growth. It moves on to describe the three key issues related to increasing this 
productivity: namely technology, water use and water management, and policy reforms 
related to markets and trade that can strengthen the enabling environment and contribute to 
the promotion of diversification towards high value agriculture. While it is important to also 
understand the dynamics of the rural labor markets, especially as it relates to inclusive 
agricultural growth, a detailed analysis is beyond the scope of this paper, and is thus not 
addressed here.  
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Rural Poverty and Role of Agriculture in Inclusive Growth 
 
27. Pakistan’s poverty headcount has been steadily declining over the past decade, 
although there are substantial and persistent differences between poverty rates in urban and 
rural areas. Pakistan’s overall poverty rate has declined from 34.5 percent in 2001-02 to 17.2 
percent in 2007-08. This poverty reduction has not been equal across urban and rural areas 
with rural poverty remaining much higher than urban poverty (Figure 1). The discrepancies 
between rural and urban poverty are particularly pronounced in some provinces. For 
example, the 2008 rural poverty rate tends to be double the urban poverty rate in Punjab 
and more than two and half a times in Sindh. 
 
28. Despite a fall in the national poverty rate, the rate of rural poverty reduction has 
tended to lag behind urban poverty reduction, with rural poverty still twice as high as urban 
poverty. IFPRI (2012) estimates that only 17.5 percent of the poor live in urban areas; the 
remainder representing a range of different rural households. About 39 percent of the poor 
are rural non-farm income dependent households, 9.7 percent are from households of 
landless farmers, 11.8 percent from households of agricultural wage laborers, 20.1 percent 
are small farm households, and 1.9 percent of the poor come from medium to large farm 
households. 
 
 
 
 
Source: World Bank (2012a) 
 
29. About half of the rural poor tend to be in non-farm activities (Figure 2), and there is a 
close relationship between land ownership and rural poverty. Many of the rural poor are 
landless or own only small amounts of land. Anwar et al. (2004) estimated the poverty 
headcount of rural non-farm households to be about 48 percent, second only to that of 
landless farmers (55 percent), but greater than that of farmers with less than a hectare of 
land (32 percent). There is virtually no poverty among farm households with more than a 
hectare of land, emphasizing the strong relationship between land ownership and poverty. 
This is exacerbated by the highly unequal distribution of land in Pakistan. The Gini 
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coefficient of land holdings in Pakistan is about 0.66 – a figure which has remained relatively 
constant between 1970 and 2000 (World Bank, 2007a). This estimate does not account for 
the fact that 63 percent of households were landless in 2000. When these landless 
households are accounted for in the Gini coefficient estimation, the value rises to 0.86, 
higher than that of other South Asian countries. Relating land ownership to farm size, World 
Bank (2007a) also found that in 2000, 61 percent of farm households owned less than 2.0 
hectares of holdings, representing about 15 percent of total land holdings. In contrast, 2 
percent of households owned holdings greater than 20.2 hectares, representing 30 percent of 
total land holdings. 
 
 
 
 
Source: IFPRI (2012) 
 
30. The current characteristics of rural poverty and the land rights regime in Pakistan 
pose a major challenge to faster poverty reduction. The majority of rural poor are landless, 
and even among those farming, poverty is significantly higher among sharecroppers (i.e., 
landless who are operating land under tenancy arrangements) than landowners (Malik, 
2005). However, land is rarely bought and sold, and the status quo of unequal land 
distribution tends to be maintained. The World Bank (2007a) noted that the inequality in 
landholdings by province5 remained relatively unchanged from the 1970s to 2000s. The 
study argues that the low rate of transactions is due in large part to high transactions costs 
and prices in excess of the discounted value of potential agricultural earnings from the land. 
Since the landless do not have access to credit—with land being the most commonly accepted 
collateral for formal loans—they are unable to generate financing to acquire land in the first 
place. This is characteristic of the barriers to land acquisition, and contributes to the status 
quo of highly unequal distribution of land. 
                                                          
5 Inequality in land holdings was measured as a Gini coefficient. Punjab tended to have the lowest Gini 
coefficients, while North West Frontier Province (now Khyber Pakhtunkhwa) tended to have the highest. 
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31. Pakistan’s population growth rate can be expected to contribute to the steady rise of 
small farms as land is divided into smaller plots in successive generations. In 1973, the 
average farm size was 5.3 ha and there were 1.06 million small (less than two hectare) farms. 
By 2000, the average farm size had shrunk to 3.1 ha, while the number of small farms had 
more than tripled (Headey et al., 2010; Hazell et al., 2012). The evidence on the impact of 
declining farm sizes on land productivity is mixed (Kiani, 2008, finds a negative but 
insignificant correlation between farm size and productivity). Small and large farms are 
more productive than medium farms, with the smaller farms associated with higher intensity 
and irrigation and large farms with capital intensive production. Despite potentially higher 
productivity per se (that is higher output per cultivated unit of land ) of smaller farms, say 
through better access to technology and more intensive cultivation, the impact on household 
incomes may be limited due to limited scope for diversification and limited access to 
resources (Malik, 2005). Given that small farm households also tend to have a higher 
poverty rate, with no significant changes in access to services, technology, markets and 
credit, the growth in the number of small farms could result in continuing high levels of 
poverty. 
 
32. The high population growth rate and slow transition of labor out of agriculture also 
puts pressure on rural economy to produce sufficient employment for new workers. Hazell et 
al. (2012) estimate the necessary labor exit rates out of agriculture6 given varying levels of 
agricultural growth. The authors use a stylized partial equilibrium model where the exit rate 
from agriculture is a function of the employment share of rural workers in agriculture, the 
rural growth rate, the growth rate of the agricultural sector, and an agricultural employment 
elasticity of 0.2. It is then estimated that if the average annual agricultural growth rate was 
3.88 percent per year, then the exit rate for labor out of the sector would have to be 1.88 
percent in the 2010-20 period, and 1.49 in the 2020-30 period, in order to maintain full 
rural employment. If the agricultural growth rate is a more sluggish 1.94 percent per year, 
then these exit rates would need to be 2.3 percent and 1.91% per year for the 2010-20 and 
2020-30 periods, respectively.  
 
33. Expansion of the rural non-farm sector would contribute towards generating 
employment and reducing poverty although its contributions depend to a large extent on the 
success of the agricultural sector as well. There are several constraints to the development of 
the rural non-farm sector. The rural non-farm sector tends to be largely services, essentially 
serving local markets. So, if the local economy is growing slowly, this will be reflected in the 
non-farm sector’s growth.  
 
34. A balanced approach that expands incomes of both farm and non-farm incomes is 
thus necessary, as is illustrated by a recent analysis7 carried out by IFPRI (2012). The 
analysis suggests that there is potential for agriculture-led growth to be more poverty 
reducing than nonagriculture-led growth by comparing the economic impacts of historical 
total factor productivity (TFP) growth to the economic impacts under counterfactual 
scenarios where TFP growth is accelerated. IFPRI (2012) considers five counterfactual 
                                                          
6 The exit rate is defined as the sum of labor absorption into the rural nonfarm economy and out-migration to 
urban areas, and must be equal to the difference between growth rate in the rural work force and the projected 
growth rate in agricultural employment. 
7 The analysis uses a comparative static single-region computable general equilibrium simulation model of 
Pakistan based on a 2007-08 Social Accounting Matrix and HIES survey data. 
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scenarios that test the sensitivity of the Pakistani economy to rapid growth (through 
increases in TFP) in four broad sectors: crops, livestock, industry, and services. In the first 
four scenarios, total factor productivities of sectors in each of these broad groups are 
increased by 10 percent, individually. So, the first scenario increases TFP of only crops, the 
second of only livestock, the third of only industry, and the fourth of only services. The fifth 
scenario increases the productivity of all sectors simultaneously. 
 
35. A 10 percent TFP increase in services sector would lead to a 5.4 percent increase in 
GDP, while 10 percent TFP increases in crops and livestock lead to GDP increases of 1.8 
percent and 1 percent, respectively (Figure 3). The impacts on overall GDP is not surprising, 
because of the relative sizes of the various subsectors. Services account for 53 percent of the 
2010 value added (share of total GDP), while crops and livestock only account for 9.43 
percent and 11.43 percent, respectively (IFPRI, 2012). To make the relative contributions 
more comparable, it is necessary to neutralize the scale effect. This is done by normalizing 
the poverty and income results by the GDP changes arising in each of the scenarios, in order 
to have a fair comparison of marginal impacts given the relative differences in the sizes of the 
crop, livestock, industry, and services sectors. 
 
36. This approach allows an assessment of the sensitivity of household per capita 
incomes by household type to a one percent GDP improvement from each of the five 
counterfactual scenarios. They show that GDP growth originating in crop and livestock 
sectors tends to be the most poverty reducing among the alternative scenarios. The growth 
‘elasticity’ of household per capita income for all households is 1.22 and 1 for the crop TFP 
and livestock TFP led scenarios. In contrast, the growth elasticities of household per capita 
income are only 0.25 and 0.8 when industry and services TFP led growth are considered 
(Table 1). These distributional impacts suggest that targeting crop and livestock sectors can 
lead to more inclusive growth relative to an approach that targets industry or services. This is 
more clearly shown in Figure 4 which compares the distributional impacts for the two 
extreme cases of crops and services on different categories of households. 
 
 
 
 
Source: IFPRI (2012) 
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Household Type* Crop Livestock Industry Services 
Medium-Large Farms(241.7) -1.3 1.6 1.8 1.2 
Small-Dry Farms (67.0) 0.9 0.3 1.7 0.5 
Agricultural Wage Laborers (48.0) 2.4 1.6 2.5 -0.4 
Non-Farm Poor (38.0) 2.2 1.5 1.9 -0.1 
Non-Farm Non-Poor (66.2) 2.1 1.7 1.3 -0.1 
Urban Poor (37.0) 1.4 1.4 0.8 0.4 
Urban Non-Poor (158.8) 1.2 0.8 -1.9 1.5 
Total (88.2) 1.2 1.0 0.3 0.8 
  Note: *Numbers in parentheses indicate base level household income per capita in 1000s of Rs.   
  Source: Authors’ calculations from IFPRI (2012) model simulation result. 
 
 
 
 
 
  Source: Authors’ calculations from IFPRI (2012) model simulation results 
 
37. GDP growth being led by improvements in the crop sector will thus lead to the 
greatest improvements in household income per capita for rural non-farm households and 
the urban poor. Households that depend on agricultural wages do almost as well as in any 
other scenario. When growth is due to livestock sector TFP improvements, households with 
large farms tend to experience substantial improvements in income. In contrast, growth led 
by productivity improvements in services will be harmful to incomes for rural households 
that do not own farms. To put these into context, recall from Figure 2 that less than 2 percent 
of the poor are from medium to large farm households, while rural non-farm households and 
rural households involved in agriculture represent 39 percent and 42 percent of the poor, 
respectively. Growth led by productivity in the crop and livestock sectors would thus be a 
powerful mechanism of poverty reduction. 
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38. IFPRI (2012) conducts additional simulations which suggest that investment 
strategies that focus on non-agricultural sectors while ignoring the agriculture sector may 
exacerbate income inequality. The study considers three additional simulations, comparing 
the relative benefits of a development strategy that focuses on growth in non-agricultural 
sector versus one that relies on all sectors, thereby estimating the additional effect of 
agricultural investments. The non-agricultural sector investment scenario doubles the rate of 
historical productivity in those sectors, while the all-sector scenario doubles productivity in 
all sectors, including agriculture. In the non-agricultural investments scenario, household 
per capita incomes increase by 9.3 percent on average, while medium to large farms and 
urban non-poor have income increase of 11.7 percent and 10.3 percent, respectively. These 
are in contrast to the income increases of 6.7 percent for agricultural wage laborers, 7.6 
percent for non-farm poor and 8.6 percent for urban poor—the types of households most 
likely to be in poverty. In the scenario where investments are made in all sectors, household 
incomes increase by 11.2 percent to 12.6 percent, and are much more uniform across 
household types. 
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Agricultural Performance 
 
39. Broad based agricultural growth can directly improve agricultural incomes (especially 
among the landless and smallholder farmers) by narrowing the wide yield gaps that currently 
exist and by diversifying towards high-value agricultural products. The Planning 
Commission (2009) estimates that average yields tend to be far below the Progressive 
Farmer yields that represent the achievable upper bound (Figure 5). The yield gaps range 
from 31 percent in the case of cotton to 73 percent in the case of sugarcane grown in Sindh. 
These crops represent major shares of Pakistan’s crop production (Figure 6) and narrowing 
the yield gap for major cereals (rice and wheat) and for high value crops (cotton and 
sugarcane) would substantially boost agricultural GDP. 
 
 
 
 
  Note: Numbers on bars indicate yield for crop for national average and for difference from Progressive Farmer yields in T/ha.   
  Source: Planning Commission (2009) 
 
 
 
 
Note: Irr=Irrigated, Source: IFPRI (2012) 
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40. In light of Pakistan’s high population growth, robust agricultural growth has to be 
maintained to also generate sufficient rural employment. Table 2 shows how agricultural 
GDP growth has decelerated, while overall GDP growth rate has accelerated since the 1990s. 
At the same time, the GDP growth rates per worker have declined, severely in the case of 
agricultural GDP. In the 1990s, the average annual agricultural GDP per worker was 2.67 
percent, but had fallen to 0.28 percent in the 2000-08 period. There are thus pressures on 
the rural labor market that are being exacerbated by the sluggish agricultural sector growth.  
 
 
 
 Mean Standard Deviation 
 1990-99 2000-08 1990-99 2000-08 
Real GDP growth rate 3.92 4.76 2.02 2.19 
Ag-GDP growth rate 4.37 3.17 5.04 3.05 
GDP Growth Rate per worker 1.24 1.09 2.94 1.50 
Ag-GDP growth rate per worker 2.67 0.28 7.71 5.19 
  Source: Authors’ estimates from World Bank (2011a) 
 
41. Pakistan’s value added in agriculture has almost doubled in real terms over the past 
two decades, going from USD 11.6 billion (constant 2000 dollars) in 1990 to USD 23.1 billion 
in 2009. It had sluggish growth in the 1990s and early part of the decade, but the growth rate 
has picked up since 2004-05. In 1990s, the average annual growth rate of the value added 
from agriculture was 4.37 percent per year, but fell to 3.17 percent per year in the 2000 to 
2008 period. Given that the overall economy was growing in real terms by more than 4.76 
percent a year on average over this latter period, the contribution of agricultural sector to the 
overall economy has been declining. For example, in 1990s, value added from agriculture 
accounted for about 26 percent of GDP. In the 2000s this share had dropped to 21.2 percent 
(World Bank, 2011a). 
 
42. Livestock and major crops8 like wheat, basmati and IRRI rice, cotton, and sugarcane, 
account for more than 85 percent of agricultural GDP. In 2010, livestock contributed to 53 
percent of agricultural GDP, and 11 percent of total GDP, while major crops contributed 33 
percent to the sectoral GDP and 7 percent to the total GDP, as can be seen in Table 3 (IFPRI, 
2012; World Bank, 2007). Since 2005-06, the shares of livestock and minor crops in total 
agricultural output have grown, while the share of major crops has shrunk. At the same time, 
the growth of real value added for major and minor crops, as well as livestock, has also 
slowed down. In 1990s, the average annual growth rates of real value added for major and 
minor crops were 2.7 and 4.8 percent per year, respectively. However, the growth rates 
declined to 1.3 percent per year for minor crops, while staying about the same for major 
crops. The growth rate of real value added in livestock decline, from 7.0 percent per year to 
4.8 percent per year. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
8 Major crops include wheat, basmati and IRRI rice, gram, sugarcane, cotton, and tobacco (IFPRI, 2012). 
Average Annual GDP Growth and Agricultural GDP Growth Rates per Worker (%) Table 2 
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Share of Total GDP (%) 
Share of Agricultural GDP 
(%) 
Real Value Added Growth 
Rate (%) 
 
2005-06 2010 2005-06 2010 1990-00 2000-10 
Major Crops 7.6 7.0 35.2 32.8 2.7 2.8 
Minor Crops 2.7 2.4 12.3 11.1 4.8 1.3 
Livestock 10.7 11.4 49.6 53.2 7.0 4.8 
Fishing 0.3 0.4 1.3 1.8 2.7 5.2 
Forestry 0.3 0.3 1.6 1.2 -3.0 -6.8 
Total Agriculture 21.6 21.5 100 100 4.4 3. 4 
Source: IFPRI (2012) and World Bank (2007a) estimated from Pakistan Economic Survey FY 2006 and FY 2010 
 
43. The relative sizes of the fishing and forestry subsectors have remained almost the 
same over time, even though their real value growth rates have been declining. The growth 
rate of real value added from forestry continued to shrink from -3.0 percent a year in the 
1990-00 period to -6.8 percent per year in the 2000-10 period. The growth rate of value 
added from fishing grew slightly, from an average of 2.7 percent per year in the 1990s to 5.2 
percent per year in the past decade. 
 
44. The production growth rates of several major crops have been declining over the past 
decade. The production growth rates of rice, sugarcane, tobacco, and wheat were higher in 
the 1990s than in the 2000s (Table 4). In case of sugarcane, the average annual growth has 
become negative in the past decade. Rice is an exception, with a rising average annual 
growth rate over the past two decades. This has been driven almost completely by 
improvements in its yield. Rice yields have grown at a much faster rate in the 2000s relative 
to the 1990s, while the harvested area has been shrinking.  
 
45. The case of wheat, one of the most important crops for domestic consumption 
illustrates some key features of current trends in crop production. Wheat production has 
been increasing, but at a decreasing rate since 1990s. When the average annual yield growth 
and area expansion rates for the crop are examined, it can be seen that the rate of area of 
expansion has been increasing from 0.86 percent per year in the 1990s to 0.98 percent per 
year in the past decade. The slowdown in production growth can thus be traced back to yield, 
where the growth rate has slowed from 2.84 percent per year to 1.75 percent per year. 
 
 
 
 Production Yield Area 
 
2010 
Value 
(‘000 
tonnes) 
Avg. 
Growth 
Rate, 
1990-
2000 
(%) 
Avg. 
Growth 
Rate, 
2000-
2010 
(%) 
2010 
Value 
(tonnes
/ha) 
Avg. 
Growth 
Rate, 
1990-
2000 
(%) 
Avg. 
Growth 
Rate, 
2000-
2010 
(%) 
2010 
Value 
(‘000 
ha) 
Avg. 
Growth 
Rate, 
1990-
2000 
(%) 
Avg. 
Growth 
Rate, 
2000-
2010 
(%) 
Maize 3,341.0 3.18 7.44 3.6 2.28 7.38 939.0 0.84 -0.12 
Rice 7,235.0 4.26 0.55 3.1 2.81 0.19 2,365.0 1.21 -0.11 
Sugarcane 49,372.9 2.66 -0.13 52.4 0.96 0.95 942.8 1.50 -1.21 
Tobacco 119.3 4.12 1.44 2.1 1.09 1.11 55.8 2.92 0.22 
Wheat 23,310.8 3.76 2.85 2.6 2.84 1.75 9,131.6 0.86 0.98 
Source: Estimates from FAOSTAT data 
Composition of Agricultural GDP in Pakistan Table 3 
Production Growth Rates of Select Major Crops Table 4 
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46. Pakistan’s agricultural output growth rate has been decelerating, and is reflected in 
its declining TFP growth rate. Pakistan’s agriculture did exceptionally well in the 1980s with 
an average annual output growth rate of 4.8 percent, making it a global leader in agricultural 
growth (Figure 7). However, the agricultural output growth rate has shrunk to a more 
modest 3.34 percent in the past decade. The decline in growth is driven by more complex 
changes in input use and TFP.   
 
47. Decomposition of growth and relative shares of inputs and TFP provide insight into 
the sources of growth. The sources of growth have shifted significantly. In the 1980s, TFP 
growth was the prime driver, while in the 1990s and 2000s, TFP has progressively slowed 
down and growth has been increasingly driven by input use (fertilizer, labor, livestock and 
machinery) and irrigation.   
 
48. In earlier decades, Pakistan’s TFP growth was responsible for substantial shares of 
the output growth (Figure 8). For example, in the 1960s, 1980s, and 1990s TFP accounted 
for 44 percent, 67 percent, and 37 percent, respectively, of the output growth. In contrast, 
TFP accounts for less than a fifth of the growth.9 Relative to other countries, agricultural TFP 
growth since the 1990s has been very slow (Figure 9).   
 
 
 
 
Source: Fuglie (2012) 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
9 It is important to note that growth in agricultural TFP was higher in Pakistan than China till the mid-1990s, and 
grew at almost the same pace as Brazil—two of the outstanding long-term performers globally. Since the mid-
1990s, however, TFP for Pakistan has been flat while the comparators (including the high performing East Asia 
countries like Thailand, Vietnam and Indonesia) have performed markedly better. 
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 Output Growth Input Growth TFP Growth 
 2001-05 2006-09 2001-05 2006-09 2001-05 2006-09 
Bangladesh 3.6 4.8 1.6 0.5 1.9 4.2 
India 2.2 3.5 1.1 1.2 1.1 2.4 
Pakistan 2.8 3.3 2.6 2.2 0.2 1.1 
Sri Lanka 1.5 2.8 0.9 1.1 0.6 1.8 
China 3.2 3.5 0.8 0.5 2.4 3.0 
Indonesia 4.7 4.7 1.3 1.5 3.4 3.2 
Thailand 2.8 2.8 0.5 0.4 2.3 2.4 
Source: Fuglie (2012) 
 
 
 
 
    Note: Land Quality Adjusted 
    Source: Fuglie (2012) 
 
 
 
 
    Note: Land Quality Adjusted 
    Source: Fuglie (2012) 
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49. Even though growth in non-land inputs in agriculture has been rising, the changes in 
use vary by specific input. Figure 10 reveals that fertilizer, livestock, and machinery use, all 
grew faster in the past decade than they did in the 1990s. This is concurrent with lower use of 
labor and land, since less land and labor are needed due to the adoption of labor augmenting 
technologies (e.g. mechanization and draft animals) and fertilizers which can enhance yields 
substantially when used under the right conditions, like sufficient irrigation (FAO, 2012). 
Total cropped area grew at an average annual rate of 0.72 percent per year in the 1991-2000 
period with this growth rate rising to 0.83 percent per year in the 2001-2009 period10. This 
acceleration in the cropped area expansion rate is reflected in the greater use of land as an 
input in the two time periods. 
 
 
 
 
    Source: Fuglie (2012) 
 
50. A critical factor in improving the yields of these crops is water availability and the 
performance of the irrigation system. About 95 percent of Pakistan’s arable land is currently 
irrigated, up from 64 percent in 1960 and 72 percent in 1980, following decades of rapid 
expansion of irrigation. Given the arid/semi-arid conditions, access to water is absolutely 
essential to agricultural production. Irrigation expansion has thus been central to improving 
yields, as illustrated by Figure 11, which describes how the area equipped for irrigation has 
steadily grown, as a share of cropland and as a share of harvested area. What can be seen is 
that the irrigated area-cropland ratio was previously lower than the irrigated area-harvested 
area ratio. Over time, these two ratios have converged, highlighting the growing importance 
of irrigation in successful harvests. However, supply constraints and inefficiencies within the 
irrigation system threaten the continuing contributions of irrigation to crop production, with 
the threats expected to increase under climate change. Between 1990 and 2009, there was 
virtually no growth in harvested area or cropland11. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
10 Authors’ estimates from FAOSTAT cropped area data. 
11 Based on Fuglie (2012) data, the average annual growth rate was 0.7 percent in cropland, and 0.3 percent in 
harvested area. 
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Note: Irrigated area is the area equipped for irrigation; area harvested is the total area harvested for all crops, both 
temporary and permanent; cropland is arable land and land in permanent crops; the values for South Asia are 
determined by aggregating data for Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka. 
    Source: Authors’ estimates from Fuglie (2012) 
 
51. The case of wheat in Punjab can illustrate some of the key factors, such as irrigation 
use, affecting yield growth. Punjab is responsible for almost 63 percent of Pakistan’s 
agricultural output (IPP, 2012). Murgai et al. (2001) and Ali and Byerlee (2002) examine the 
TFP in crop agriculture from 1966 to 1994 in Punjab, and find that overall output growth in 
the sector was over 3 percent annually for nearly three decades, with TFP growth of 1.26 
percent per year (Table 6). However, land productivity growth rates had declined since the 
Green Revolution while the labor productivity growth rate had risen due to the adoption of 
labor augmenting technologies (e.g. tractors).  
 
52. There is substantial variation in productivity growth by wheat production system 
with much of the TFP declines attributed to resource degradation. Ali and Byerlee (2002) 
also found that TFP growth had been strong in wheat-cotton and wheat-mung bean 
production systems, and negative in wheat-rice system. The study suggests that the negative 
TFP growth in wheat-rice system was due to degradation in soil and water quality 
throughout the province and there is evidence that some of this depletion is related to the 
use of inputs considered to be important components of modern high-productivity 
agricultural practices. On average, this deterioration in resource quality lowered annual 
productivity growth by 0.53 percent in the province. Thus TFP growth could have been much 
higher in the absence of resource degradation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.30
0.40
0.50
0.60
0.70
0.80
0.90
1.00
1
9
9
0
1
9
9
1
1
9
9
2
1
9
9
3
1
9
9
4
1
9
9
5
1
9
9
6
1
9
9
7
1
9
9
8
1
9
9
9
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
1
2
0
0
2
2
0
0
3
2
0
0
4
2
0
0
5
2
0
0
6
2
0
0
7
2
0
0
8
2
0
0
9
Pakistan - Irrigated Area/Cropland South Asia - Irrigated Area /Cropland
Pakistan - Irrigated Area/Harvested Area South Asia - Irrigated Area /Harvested Area
Irrigated Area as a Share of Cropland and Harvested Area Figure 11 
Agriculture and Water Policy: Toward Sustainable Inclusive Growth 
 
27 
 
 
 
 
Production 
System 
Time Period Partial Factor Productivity 
Total Factor Productivity for 
Crop Sub-Sector 
  Water Land Labor Output Input TFP 
Wheat-
Mixed 
1966-1994 -1.9 2.09 n.a. 2.29 1.42 0.87 
 Green 
Revolution 
-3.08 2.54 -5.09 3.35 4.46 1.12 
Intensification 
Period  
-1.5 3.51 1.67 2.25 0.75 1.5 
Post-Green 
Revolution 
-0.9 0.02 2.66 1.87 1.4 0.46 
Wheat-Rice 
1966-1994 -3.03 0.89 1.03 1.79 2.3 -0.5 
 Green 
Revolution 
-7.31 0.76 -2.11 3.44 5.88 -2.43 
Intensification 
Period  
-3.65 0.88 0.8 1.24 1.84 -0.6 
Post-Green 
Revolution 
0.14 1.85 3.01 2.04 1.17 0.88 
Wheat-
Cotton 
1966-1994 -0.25 2.98 3.44 3.65 2.08 1.57 
 Green 
Revolution 
-4.99 3.18 -1.81 3.66 3.96 -0.3 
Intensification 
Period  
0.1 2.32 3.48 3.55 1.77 1.79 
Post-Green 
Revolution 
1.96 2.9 4.3 2.7 0.92 1.77 
Wheat-
Mungbean 
1966-1994 -3.49 1.89 3.08 3.68 2.36 1.32 
 Green 
Revolution 
-7.85 4.36 0.95 6.79 4.55 2.24 
Intensification 
Period  
-2.81 -1.26 0.7 1.31 2.02 -0.7 
Post-Green 
Revolution 
-0.48 3.68 7.7 4.8 1.56 3.24 
All 
1966-1994 -1.41 2.43 2.51 3.23 1.97 1.26 
 Green 
Revolution 
-5.14 2.75 -2.85 4 4.49 -0.49 
Intensification 
Period  
-1.29 2.22 2.33 2.77 1.5 1.27 
Post-Green 
Revolution 
0.61 1.96 4.14 2.85 1.25 1.6 
Note: Green Revolution 1966-1974; Intensification Period 1975-1984; Post-Green Revolution 1985-1994 
    Source: Adapted from Ali and Byerlee (2002) 
 
53. Input intensities jumped substantially during and after the Green Revolution, when 
modern varieties were adopted (Ali and Byerlee, 2002; Murgai et al. 2001). For example, 
fertilizer use jumped from an average of 14.1 kg/ha during the Green Revolution to an 
average of 86.1 kg/ha in the post-Green Revolution period. Pesticide use also increased 
rapidly, especially for cotton in the post-Green Revolution period. Water supply and 
availability greatly improved through investment (largely private) in tube wells, especially 
during the Green Revolution and intensification periods. However, water productivity is 
negative because of inefficient use of irrigation water, partially due to subsidies on canal 
water prices, and fixed electricity rates on tube wells (Farquee, 1995). 
 
Average Annual Growth Rates in Factor Productivities in Punjab, 1966-1994 (%) Table 6 
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54. While labor productivity generally grew in the 1966-94 period, it shrank during the 
Green Revolution (1966-74). The technologies being adopted increased average labor use for 
crops from 85 person-days/ha in the Green Revolution period to 99 person-days/ha in the 
intensification period (Ali and Byerlee, 2003; Murgai et al., 2001). Eventually, the additional 
labor demand together with non-farm demands, raised wages and induced mechanization, 
which then led to a decline in labor use and a rapid improvement in labor productivity.  
 
55. There are a range of other factors that have also contributed to the sluggish TFP 
growth rate for wheat in Punjab. These include severe droughts and reduced effectiveness of 
agricultural research and extension. Increasingly frequent power disruptions are also major 
constraints to Punjab’s agricultural production (IPP, 2012).  
 
56. Climate change is anticipated to put additional stress on agricultural production, with 
the impacts varying by region and crop. Yu et al. (2012) consider a range of climate change 
scenarios12 to estimate impacts on the economy. Production impacts in the crop sub-sector 
vary by crop and region. Crop production declines are greatest in Sindh, where it declines by 
10 percent on average. In the most extreme case, Sindh’s crop production shrinks by 36 
percent. In contrast, Punjab’s crop production shrinks by only 5 percent in the worst case 
scenario. In terms of crops being affected, the IRRI rice and sugarcane production 
experience the largest declines, with about 6 percent decline on average. If the monthly 
hydrograph shifts forward by a month—April inflows becoming March inflows—then the 
negative impacts are exacerbated. 
 
57. Most of the negative real income effects of climate change in Punjab and Sindh are 
expected to be on households outside of the agriculture sector, since those households will be 
facing higher food prices without any corresponding increase in income that agricultural 
households would experiences. GDP, agriculture GDP and household income are estimated 
to decrease by 1.1 percent, 5.1 percent, and 2 percent respectively. GDP, agriculture GDP and 
household income are estimated to decrease by 2.7 percent, 12 percent, and 5.3 percent, 
respectively in the most extreme climate future. Percent declines in agricultural production 
are smaller than the percent increases in prices, leading to a positive change in farm income. 
Households that do not depend on farm-income as their primary source of income, however, 
will have to pay more for food, and will thus see their real incomes decline. 
 
58. Sufficiently high crop yield improvements can be the best way to adapt to climate 
change. Yu et al. (2012) estimate13 that if crop yields were to improve by 20 percent, then 
GDP, agricultural GDP, and household incomes would rise by 2.6 percent, 11.6 percent, and 
3.4 percent, respectively, more than compensating for the effects of climate change. 
Furthermore, the 20 percent yield improvement is a realistic goal, given that wheat and rice 
yields improved by 1-2 percent per year over the 1989-99 period. Even after a 20 percent 
improvement in wheat and rice yields, there would still be a substantial yield gap between 
the average achieved yield and what is currently achievable in the best case scenario (as 
illustrated by Figure 5). 
                                                          
12 The study considered 70 different possible climate scenarios which were characterized by river inflows varying 
from 10 percent to 90 percent exceedance probability and temperature changes ranging from 1°C to 4.5°C. 
13 Yu et al. (2012) use the CGE economic simulation model of IFPRI (2012), described earlier, to examine the 
effects of three different counterfactual adaptation policies—improving crop yields, improving the efficiency of 
the irrigation system, and building new dams. 
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Key Issues and Challenges 
 
59. Spurring inclusive growth in the agriculture sector will thus require improvements in 
productivity, and this section discusses some of the major policy and technical barriers to the 
necessary improvements. It starts with a description of some of the areas of improvement in 
agricultural research, development, and extension. It then moves on to a discussion of the 
institutional and technical inefficiencies of the water management and irrigation system. 
Finally, it reviews the range of policies that distort agricultural output and input markets, 
and discourage diversification. 
 
Technology  
 
60. As discussed earlier, there is substantial room for improvement in Pakistan’s crop 
yields. The national average yields of major crops like wheat and rice are currently only 
about 55 percent of Progressive Farmer yields, which represent the highest achievable yields 
in Pakistan (Figure 5). These yield gaps are even greater for some commercial crops like 
sugarcane in Sindh. Despite the large potential for improvement, yield growth has been 
steadily declining over the years. For example, rice yields grew at an average annual rate of 
5.24 percent in the 1960s and 3.16 percent in the 1990s, whereas they have only been 
growing at 1.68 percent per year this past decade14. A similar pattern can be seen in the case 
of wheat, which had average annual yield growth of 2.92 percent in the 1960s and 1.99 
percent in the 1990s. This growth rate is now only 1.1 percent per year. 
 
61. Much of the high historical growth in yields can be attributed to major scientific 
breakthroughs in technology, as during the Green Revolution, resulting from investments in 
agricultural research undertaken by the national agricultural research system. Agricultural 
R&D in Pakistan has historically been led by the public sector, and has proven to be a good 
investment. But this research has also been biased towards technologies focused on the use 
of modern inputs, while ignoring public goods such as integrated crop management, 
sustainable production systems, efficient input use, and the balancing of external input use 
and internal nutrient sources. About half of the public research expenditure is on crops, 
followed by a quarter on natural resources, about 14 percent on livestock and fisheries, and 
about 9 percent on social sciences (World Bank, 2011d). 
   
62. The historical review of Ahmad and Nagy (2001) shows Pakistan’s public agricultural 
research system has been successful—estimated internal rates of return from investments in 
agricultural research have ranged from 57 percent to 65 percent, with most of the returns 
coming from Green Revolution research. Following a period of nationalization of large and 
medium sized private agribusiness firms in the mid-1970s, there was a slow process of 
denationalization and deregulation of these entities. Investment in private agricultural 
research and development was thus severely curtailed for a long time, with only recent 
outreach to the private sector through programs like the Science and Technology for 
Development program.  
 
 
                                                          
14Authors’ estimates using FAOSTAT data. 
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63. However, there are severe technical capacity constraints to the current agricultural 
research system. According to ASTI data, public investment in agricultural research has been 
on the decline. It is currently about 0.21 percent of agricultural GDP and ranks at the bottom 
of agricultural R&D spending as a share of agricultural GDP in the region (Figure 12). The 
Planning Commission (2009) notes that persistent funding constraints may have 
contributed to limited technology advancements even in major cultivars. Only 15 percent of 
agricultural research staff trained holds PhDs, which is low relative to the educational 
attainment of researchers in the rest of South Asia (Beintema et al. 2007). Qualified research 
staff is discouraged from public research agencies due to institutional disincentives such as 
limited promotion opportunities and low salaries. 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: ASTI (2012) 
 
64. The technical capacity constraints are compounded by inefficiencies generated by the 
institutional environment. Beintema et al. (2007) identified a total of 111 agencies involved in 
agricultural R&D, employing more than 3,600 researchers and spending nearly Rs. 2.4 
billion (constant 2000 Rupees). Of these, 37 were federal agencies, 98 were provincial 
agencies, and 13 were private sector entities. The Pakistan Agricultural Research Council 
(PARC) coordinates the activities of a large network of public national and provincial 
agricultural research bodies, institutes and experimental stations. PARC does not conduct 
agricultural research itself, though the National Agricultural Research Center (NARC) is 
under its administration. With the passing of the 18th Amendment to the Constitution15 in 
2010, the public agricultural system has been devolving from the federal to the provincial 
level, creating new opportunities for re-energized public agricultural research. By moving the 
research agenda to the provincial and local levels, research can have a greater focus on the 
needs of local farmers and environmental conditions.  
                                                          
15 The 18th Amendment switched the government from a semi-presidential system to a parliamentary republic. 
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65. Diversification is also influenced by changes in technology affecting the relative 
profitability and risk, among other factors16 (Pingali and Rosegrant, 1995). The analysis of 
diversification in India from Joshi et al. (2003) illustrates these factors to be in play. Aside 
from the essential improvements in markets and roads, the study found that there were 
complex interactions between technological improvements and technology absorption of 
different commodities. For example, they found that greater adoption of technology for 
cereals was related to less diversification in favor of high value commodities. Similarly, 
diversification towards horticulture and livestock production, relatively more profitable 
products than cereals, was greater in areas that benefited less from the Green Revolution, 
such as rain-fed areas. These rain-fed areas were found to diversify into non-cereals away 
from cereals, and were found to be growing faster than regions specializing in cereals. This 
growth also had distributional implications since high-value commodities were grown more 
by small holder farms. 
 
66. Agricultural extension services need to be developed in parallel to R&D for greater 
uptake of relevant information to target groups. Extension services have suffered from weak 
linkages to agricultural research institutions, reflected in low technical capacity of the 
services (World Bank, 2011d). Administrative devolution has further weakened these 
services, with greater budgetary pressures and unclear linkages to the bureaucracy. 
 
67. The focus of extension services needs to expand even as it improves targeting. 
Historically, the extension services have focused on disseminating technology to farmers. 
However, there is a range of additional information that may be helpful to the farmer, such 
as advice on quality standards in production and marketing, which is currently not being 
provided. There is also a disproportionate uptake of extension services by larger farms 
relative to small and medium sized farms. Focusing on the case of sugarcane technologies, 
Abbas et al. (2003) found that information on varieties was taken up by 73 percent of large 
farms, relative to 64 percent of small farms. This discrepancy is even greater when advice on 
sowing methods and fertilizer application were considered. 73 percent of large farms adopted 
sowing methods from extension services, compared to about 40 percent of small and 
medium sized farms. Given that increasing small holder productivity is critical to enhancing 
agricultural production, agricultural extension will need to expand on improving adoption 
among this group. 
 
Inefficient Water Use and Water Resource Management 
 
68. Pakistan’s irrigated land as a proportion of cropland is the highest in South Asia, with 
about 95 percent of arable land being equipped for irrigation (Figure 13). Pakistan has been 
able to accelerate the rate of expansion of areas under irrigation, from an average annual rate 
of 1.24 percent in the 1960s to 1.44 percent in the 2000s (Figure 14). Pakistan has an 
irrigation potential of 21.3 million ha of land, of which 19.3 million ha is equipped for 
irrigation: 35.9 percent is for surface water, 21.4 percent for groundwater, and 41.3 percent 
for a mix of surface and groundwater sources (FAO, 2010). The Indus Basin Irrigation 
System (IBIS) supports this irrigation system, with about 106 million-acre-feet (MAF) of 
water flows diverted from the river system to canals. 
 
                                                          
16 These other factors include changes per capita income and urbanization, improvements in infrastructure, and 
changes in factor endowments 
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Note: Cropland is the FAO arable land and land in permanent crops; the values for South Asia are determined by 
aggregating data for Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka. 
Source: Authors’ estimates from Fuglie (2012) 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Cropland is the FAO arable land and land in permanent crops; the values for South Asia are determined by 
aggregating data for Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka. 
Source: Authors’ estimates from Fuglie (2012) 
 
69. Farmers’ access to water however is less than it could be due to major limitations of 
the water allocation system. At the farm level, access to canal water is determined by physical 
location along the canal and through the warabandi water allocation system of 
administratively set rotations. Access to canal water then becomes contingent on access to 
land, and the location of that land. There might not be enough water by the time it gets to 
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land at the tail end of distributaries or watercourses, especially if upstream farmers illegally 
access the water (Yu et al., 2012).  
 
70. Another critical challenge to the irrigation system under the current water 
management system is that it is financially unsustainable. The canal irrigation management 
system recovers only a quarter of its annual operating and maintenance costs, with the 
shortfall expected to increase with rising costs and stagnant Abiana (water charges per acre 
of crops irrigated) (Planning Commission, 2012). The collection rate of assessed Abiana is 
also low—at only 60 percent of assessed values. The overall budget gap is about Rs. 5.4 
billion annually, with the system thus being subsidized by the federal government. 
 
71. The current Abiana for different crops might also be distorting farmer decisions. The 
national average Abiana per acre over the 2000-09 period for different crops were between 
Rs. 126 and 214 for cotton, Rs. 185 and 428 for sugarcane, Rs. 125 and 210 for rice, Rs. 69 to 
136 for maize, and Rs. 75 to 131 for wheat, respectively. Comparing the Abiana for rice and 
cotton—two major export crops—it can be seen that their irrigation charges per acre are 
about the same, even though rice requires 60 percent more water than cotton. These charges 
may not reflect relative profitability of the two crops, leading to a possible overproduction of 
rice. 
 
72. Availability of groundwater has an even higher impact on yields than the availability 
of canal water, but less than 10 percent of cultivating households owned tube wells in 2001-
02. Groundwater markets significantly improve access for small farmers, landless tenants 
and younger households who often lack the resources (or land and water rights) to install 
their own tube well (World Bank, 2007). However, water purchasers do not have full access 
rights to the water, and in times of energy or water scarcity can be denied access. Access to 
groundwater also depends on the distance to the tube well, in addition to the existence and 
efficiency of the channels to distribute that water.  
 
73. Recognizing the importance of a robust and efficient water management system, the 
Government of Pakistan implemented reforms in the 1990s. As reviewed in World Bank 
(2011b), these reforms restructured the Public Irrigation Departments (PIDs) to Provincial 
Irrigation and Drainage Authorities (PIDAs); Area Water Boards (AWBs) to manage main 
and branch canals; and Farmers’ Organizations (FOs) and Water User Associations (WUAs) 
to manage distributor and minor canals. The goal of these reforms was to enhance water use 
efficiency, streamline the water resources management, and facilitate participation by users. 
 
74. These reforms however have not been completely successful, due to problems at both 
the provincial and local levels. At the provincial level, the devolution of autonomy from the 
PIDs is incomplete. World Bank (2011b) illustrates by describing the case of Punjab’s PID 
and PIDA, where the Secretary of the PID is also the Managing Director of the PIDA. 
Another example is from Sindh, where even though the posts of PID’s Secretary and PIDA’s 
Managing Director are held by different people, the latter has a direct reporting relationship 
to the former. 
 
75. At the local level, the FOs either do not have the resources or the capacity to fulfill 
their roles. As noted by World Bank (2011b), FOs have no input into the Abiana setting 
process, even though they might be responsible for collecting the charges. FOs also vary 
widely in regard to their role as charge collectors, since this is a determination made by 
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management, which in turn, they may or may not have any voice in. The lack of clarity in the 
role of FOs and their widely varying mandate across local governments has contributed to 
inefficiencies in Abiana collection that are damaging the financial sustainability of the 
system. 
 
76. The Planning Commission (2012) recognizes these challenges, and has proposed a 
series of recommendations. These recommendations include the revision of Abiana rates to 
be economically reasonable (i.e. reflecting the profitability of irrigated crops), reviewing the 
Abiana collection mechanisms, improving service provision, and water trading at the Indus 
River System Authority (IRSA) level, inter alia. The most important intervention however 
would be institutional reform of the entire management system to a) complete devolution of 
authority to the relevant scale; b) clarify the roles and mandates of each authority; c) provide 
sufficient resources and capacity building to allow devolved authorities to fulfill their 
mandates. It would be difficult and potentially detrimental to implement specific reforms, 
such as revision of Abiana or introducing water trading, in current dysfunctional 
institutional environment. Institutional clarity and ownership of reforms are thus key 
prerequisites to any other intervention. 
 
77. The irrigation system is highly inefficient as is demonstrated by substantial seepage 
losses which occur in almost every component of the delivery system. Only 41 MAF of 
irrigation water reach crops out of the 106 MAF that is in the system, equivalent to about 61 
percent of the initial water delivered at the head17 (Table 7). 25 MAF and 17 MAF are lost in 
watercourses and in fields, which are the most vulnerable components of the irrigation 
system. The overall efficiency of the system is about 35 percent, and improving the canal 
system’s efficiency from 35 percent to 50 percent could boost growth substantially. Yu et al. 
(2012) estimated that GDP and GDP from the agriculture sector would decline by 1.1 percent 
and 5.1 percent on average, under climate change. An improvement to the canal system’s 
efficiency that saved just an additional 12 MAF would improve GDP by 0.94 percent and 
agricultural GDP by 4.22 percent, on average, even under climate change. 
 
 
 
 
Location Delivery at Head Losses 
 MAF Percentage* MAF 
Main and branch canals 106 15 16 
Distributaries and Minors 90 8 7 
Watercourses 83 30 25 
Fields 58 30 17 
Crop Use 41   
Total  61** 65 
Note:  *Percentage loss estimates are based on losses in MAF for that location and the delivery delivered at location head; 
**Total percentage loss = 100*(65/106) 
Source: Yu et. al. (2012) 
 
                                                          
17 The 61 percent seepage loss is in the ballpark of seepage losses in surface water irrigation in South Asia. Global 
Water Partnership (2011) synthesizes discussion that argue that over 49 percent of water passing through surface 
water irrigation systems is lost through seepage, with another 12 percent lost through evaporation. The synthesis 
also argues that some of water lost through the seepage is recovered because it recharges groundwater. 
Seepage Losses in Irrigation System Table 7 
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78. Another limitation to water access is at the provincial level due to institutional 
features such as the 1991 Provincial Water Allocation Accord. Since 1991, water inflows have 
been apportioned among the provinces by the Indus Water Accord, allocating flows among 
the provinces based on a 5-year record of pre-Accord historical canal diversions. It assumes 
average flow of 114.35 MAF of water in the Indus system, and allocates 55.94 MAF to Punjab 
and 48.76 MAF to Sindh, with remainder going to Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. 
The Accord accounts for the possibility of surplus water in the system, allocating 37 percent 
of the surplus to Punjab and Sindh each, with the remainder being distributed to other 
provinces. The agreement does not, however, have a mechanism to deal with extremely low 
flow conditions or agreed-upon transfers across provinces (Yu et al., 2012).  
 
79. Relaxation of the institutional rigidities of the Accord can allow for a more market-
based allocation of water leading to aggregate economic benefits. Yu et al. (2012) estimate 
that by relaxing the allocation constraints of the Accord, an additional 14 MAF of water 
enters the system, with both Punjab and Sindh experiencing increases in canal diversions 
with the effects varying by agro-climatic zone. Punjab and Sindh gain Rs. 83 and Rs. 82 
billion in revenue, while other provinces collectively lose about Rs. 7 billion. 
 
80. Relaxing the conditions of the Accord by itself, without complementary policy may 
lead to outcomes that are not necessarily pro-poor. The complementary policy would need to 
compensate groups that the Accord relaxation would harm, such as farmers in Baluchistan 
and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, or producers of crops that are not irrigated. One possibility would 
be to collect a part of the gains in Punjab and Sindh through revenue, and then transfer them 
to affected groups through targeted transfers. Such a policy would need to first identify the 
magnitude of the gains and losses by group, construct appropriate collection and transfer 
instruments, and establish a federal body that can regulate this process. 
 
Markets, Trade and Diversification 
 
81. Pakistan experienced considerable growth in both exports and imports over the past 
decade. Export receipts grew by 13.9 percent per year during this period, while import 
payments rose by 12.8 percent per year. Total export receipts changed by USD 33.48 billion, 
while import payments changed by USD 29.65 billion (IFPRI, 2012). There is a notable 
concentration of both imports and exports in very few products: wheat and palm oil account 
for almost half of all agricultural imports, while rice is the largest export item and generates 
well over half of agricultural export earnings.  
 
82. Policies and policy reversals introduced in the past five years have steadily eroded the 
effects of trade liberalization that Pakistan implemented between 1996 and 2003. Pakistan 
had simplified its tariff structure and state trading monopolies for agricultural products had 
been abolished. However, exceptions were introduced in 2006, and a number of more 
important liberalizing reforms in agriculture were reversed, especially in regard to wheat, 
sugar and fertilizer. The use of SROs (Statutory Regulatory Orders) has also expanded since 
2006. SROs and new regulatory duties have been used to provide exemptions to normal 
tariffs in some cases, while increasing tariffs for others. The resulting trade regime is thus 
highly discretionary and uncertain, leading to high variable output and input price 
distortions. 
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83. Major crops like wheat, rice, sugar, and cotton are implicitly taxed by various price 
distortions introduced by policies in most years. Valdes et al. (2012) estimates nominal and 
effective rates of protection for output of major crops as well as for inputs used in these 
sectors. Nominal rates of protection (NRP) reflect output price distortions, which is relevant 
to buyers and consumers. Effective rates of protection (ERP) account for the effects of the 
trade regime and other policies on costs as well as output price. Tradable inputs have a net 
subsidy, driven by the subsidy on fertilizer. The subsidy rate on fertilizer is about 35 percent, 
and overwhelms any taxes on other inputs. It also represents a substantial fiscal cost. 
 
84. The policy-induced implicit tax on crop production serves to depress production, 
despite implicit net input subsidies. For example, basmati rice had negative ERPs between 
2008 and 2010, when farm income would have been higher by 21 percent to 40 percent 
under a no-intervention regime. The case of sugar is also similar. The significant increase in 
the world price of refined sugar increased the parity price, but the increase in the general 
sales tax applied to sugar offsets higher border prices. The NRP on sugarcane at the farm 
gate is negative and high—the parity prices are approximately double the observed farm gate 
price. The wedge driven between the parity price and the farm gate price leads to lower 
effective production.  
 
85. Government procurement of wheat is extensive, and involves federal, provincial and 
district level agencies. The government sets the procurement price with expected 
procurement targets that the Pakistan Agricultural Storage and Services Corporation 
(PASSCO) and Provincial Food Departments are responsible for meeting. Provincial 
governments (mainly Punjab and Sindh) and PASSCO procure about 20 percent of total 
wheat production each year (Prikhodko and Zrilyi, 2012). 
 
86. The government maintains high domestic wheat procurement prices. The objective of 
these high prices is to support farm incomes, and encourage sufficient production for the 
domestic needs. However, domestic prices can exceed the import price parity levels, as 
happened in 2009-10, since wheat can only be imported under special circumstances and by 
specific parties, such as for supply to Afghanistan under the auspices of international 
humanitarian missions. 
 
87. Wheat procurement policies have a price stabilizing effect. Valdes et al. (2012) note 
that in spite of high volatility in border prices, both wholesale and farm gate wheat prices 
appear relatively stable. It is suggested that federal procurement through PASSCO and 
Provincial Food Departments are absorbing the price transmission that would otherwise 
prevail in open markets. Indeed, since the government controls domestic wheat prices and 
procurement volumes, as well as international wheat trade, there is very little price 
transmission from world markets to domestic markets.  
 
88. However, the impact of these procurement policies is negative on the welfare of net 
buyers (the majority of the landless poor, will be negatively affected)—they are fiscally 
unsustainable, and can lead to perverse outcomes like subsidized exports.18 The ERP on 
wheat has fluctuated from negative to positive values over the past few years. Valdes et al. 
(2012) explain that this is mainly due to shifts in implicit NRP on the product price, which 
                                                          
18 The full distributional impact of different categories of households, in particular the producer-consumer 
households, needs to be carefully analyzed.  
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was negative over the three years, but small in 2009-10. The implicit NRP on tradable input 
costs was negative—implying a subsidy to farmers—and relatively stable compared to that on 
output price. The negative ERP in 2008-09 accompanied an effective subsidy to consumers, 
since the cost of imported wheat was greater than the issue price wheat at which the 
government releases grain to flour mills through its public procurement mechanisms. All 
procured wheat is bought and then sold to flour millers in the same wheat marketing year, 
with the government absorbing the costs of procurement, storage, and financing. Millers are 
able to buy the subsidized wheat at below market prices, and then sell the flour at open 
market prices, which are the prices faced by consumers. 
 
89. Reforming Pakistan’s wheat procurement is thus a key area for domestic trade policy. 
The simplest reform would be to reduce the wheat procurement volume. This would reduce 
the fiscal burden of the subsidy as well as the effective subsidy to wheat producers. Valdes et 
al. (2012) also argue that reduction of the wheat procurement does not have to jeopardize 
food security (through price management) objectives. The study argues that rules-based 
adjustable tariffs that set floor and ceiling prices to follow world prices and social safety net 
programs can be implemented in parallel to a scale back in wheat procurement. These 
policies would address the food security concern, while reducing the scope for extreme 
distortions caused by the procurement policies (e.g. exports of subsidized wheat).  
 
90. An enabling policy environment can also encourage the growth of high value 
agriculture (HVA), which can maximize returns to scarce factors of production, like land and 
water.  Higher value agriculture would include crops like oilseeds, fruits, vegetables, and 
livestock, while low value agriculture would include cereals. Domestic demand for these 
products will continue to rise rapidly as incomes increase and diets become more diversified 
if marketing channels function efficiently (World Bank, 2007a). 
 
91. Pakistan, like the rest of South Asia, has been slowly diversifying towards HVA. As 
estimated in Joshi et al. (2003), Pakistan’s crop sub-sector has diversified between 1991 and 
2000. The study estimated the Simpson Index of Diversity, and found that Pakistan’s index 
had risen from 0.56 to 0.57 over the period—a minor increase that is consistent with the 
average improvement for South Asia, which rose from 0.66 to 0.67. Decomposing the source 
of Pakistan’s diversification, it was found that more than three-quarters of this 
diversification occurred through utilization of fallow lands, rehabilitation of degraded lands, 
or increasing cropping intensity. Much of the area expansion also came from deforestation, 
which may have long run environmental implications. The remainder of the diversification 
was through crop substitution. 
 
92. Pakistan’s high value agricultural exports are growing rapidly. Currently high value 
agriculture (HVA) account for less than a quarter of annual export revenue. However, 
exports of these products are growing rapidly. In 1990, there were virtually no exports of 
dairy and eggs, or of meat (Hazell et al., 2012). However, in 2011 Pakistan’s exports of dairy 
and eggs were valued at USD 30.1 million (real 2000 dollars), while that of meat and 
livestock were valued at USD 106 million, as estimated from UN COMTRADE data. The 
growth of HVA exports has been rapid, with some products like fisheries and fruits, 
vegetables, and oilseeds experiencing average annual growth rates of 45 percent and 15 
percent, respectively, between 2008 and 2011 (Figure 15).  
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Source: Authors’ Calculation from UN COMTRADE 
 
93. Protection of low value crops may stifle the diversification process. In India, there is a 
high degree of support to wheat and rice through price support and water subsidies go to 
these crops, with the result being that diversification away from cereals has been slower in 
the north-west (Gulati and Pursell, 2007; Hazell et al., 2012). Pakistan’s policy environment 
can be similarly constraining, as illustrated by the wheat procurement policies and the 
irrigation water charges that favor rice production. Improvement and enforcement of 
sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) regulations are also necessary to meet international trade 
standards. These require establishment of testing facilities, training and capacity building, 
and active representation in international standard formulating agencies (Hazell et al., 2012; 
Joshi et al. 2007).  
 
94. Access to credit has the potential to enhance agricultural productivity, and would 
help facilitate a shift from cereal-based to high value agriculture by providing the necessary 
investment. Households with credit constraints had a 23 percent reduction in value of yields 
(World Bank, 2007a). Access to formal credit markets in rural areas is generally limited to 
landowners, since land is the most acceptable collateral for loans. World Bank (2007a) 
reports that only 11 percent of farmers obtained formal sector loans in 2001-02. Access to 
informal credit markets is more widespread, but approximately 40 percent of rural 
households are unable to access as much credit as they need at existing interest rates. 
Khandker and Faruqee (2001) find that farm credit schemes—such as those delivered by the 
Agricultural Development Bank of Pakistan—tend to have a higher impact on small holder 
production and welfare.  
95. Weakness in the seed sector constrains the crop sub-sector, including high value 
crops. In 1997-98, only 10.1 percent of the potential demand for seed for various crops was 
met. However, the seed sector in Pakistan has undergone several reforms and a national seed 
policy was developed in 1994. By 2007-08, 16 percent of potential demand was met. Seed for 
major crops like wheat and cotton saw some substantial improvement. The supply of wheat 
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seed rose by 126 percent from 78,554 T between 1998 and 2008, while the supply of cotton 
seed rose by 37 percent from 23,128 T over the same period (Seed Info, 2010). 
 
96. The private sector has taken the initiative in seed supply for several crops, but there is 
still a substantial gap between total supplied and potential demand. The private sector 
supplies more than 69 percent to 84 percent of the seed for wheat, rice, and cotton (Table 8), 
while imports are responsible for 66 to 88% of total seed supply for less popular crops like 
maize, vegetables, and potatoes. The public sector only has a substantial role in seed supply 
for wheat, where it is has an elaborate public procurement program.  
 
 
 
Crop 
Seed Supplied 
(T) 
Source of Supply (%) 
Supply to Potential 
Demand Ratio (%) 
  Public Private Import  
Wheat 177,792 31.2 68.8 0.0 17 
Rice 13,868 17.1 71.9 11.0 35 
Maize 9,785 2.2 31.4 66.4 33 
Vegetables 6,340 4.0 7.7 88.3 115 
Potato 8,200 7.2 8.9 84.0 3 
Cotton 31,691 15.9 84.1 0.0 49 
Source: Adapted from Seed Info (2010) 
 
97. Reforming the regulatory environment can thus enhance seed supply. Seed 
registration requirements impose restrictions on seed imports. Given the low domestic 
supply in the formal markets, farmers often resort to obtaining uncertified seed through 
informal markets and through retention. Due to the resulting heavy reliance on the informal 
sector, research and development to enhance seed production is constrained (World Bank, 
2011c).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Seed Supply of for Major Crops in 2010 Table 8 
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Policy Recommendations 
 
98. Broad-based agricultural growth can be achieved through narrowing the wide yield 
gaps and diversifying toward high-value agricultural products. This growth can improve the 
agricultural incomes of farmers (and especially of smallholders), as well as improve rural 
incomes more generally, through higher returns on land and labor—the latter benefiting the 
many rural landless poor. Actions are needed in the areas of agricultural productivity, water 
use efficiency, and trade and marketing policies to enhance agricultural growth and improve 
farm incomes (see Policy Matrix below).  
 
99. Substantial reforms to the national agricultural research system are needed. First, the 
system requires fundamental institutional reforms to make it more efficient and effective. 
With efforts underway to develop provincial agricultural research institutions, the roles of 
the PARC and the NARC need to be adjusted to exploit their comparative advantage of being 
federal institutions able to facilitate federal funding, intraprovincial knowledge, and capacity 
building. Second, with the shift in primary activities from federal to provincial levels and 
from policy coordination to agricultural research, there is a need to reflect these activities in 
human resource and performance incentives. This may require moving personnel from the 
center to provincial institutions, or even changing the composition of the staff, to increase 
the proportion of scientific research staff, for example. Third, these reforms will require 
additional spending in agricultural R&D, whether for supporting agricultural research in 
provincial research centers or capacity building of science staff, with the exact composition of 
the additional spending depending on the nature of the institutional reforms. 
 
100. These reforms to the R&D architecture, by their nature, would be very wide ranging 
and require substantial groundwork prior to execution. The first step (of two)—a stocktaking 
of the current agricultural research system—would need to include a detailed institutional 
audit that examines the system as a whole and to clearly delineate the roles, functions, and 
mandates of the public federal and provincial bodies that govern and conduct agricultural 
research. More broadly, this stocktaking would also need to account for the current roles of 
(and environment for) private R&D, including those of domestic and multinational 
agribusinesses. It should then lead to a strategic road map for overhauling the national 
agricultural research system, with particular emphasis on future budgets, human resources, 
and capacity building. In keeping with the spirit of the 18th Amendment, this strategic 
planning would need to have the input and buy-in of provincial and local government 
institutions and should not be left to just the PARC and the NARC. The second step would be 
to roll out the appropriate reforms over the next one or two budget cycles 
 
101. To improve water use efficiency, the most important intervention would be 
institutional reform of the entire water management system. Given the system’s high 
dysfunction, clarifying the institutional environment would be a prerequisite for any other 
intervention under consideration, such as revising the Abiana. The reforms to the water 
management system include completely devolving authority to the relevant scale, clarifying 
the roles and mandates of each authority, and providing sufficient resources and capacity 
building to allow the devolved authorities to fulfill their mandates.  
 
102. As with the reforms to the national agricultural research system, reforms to the whole 
water management system will require action over multiple years and will need to be 
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carefully considered. Water management systems show wide divergence in budgets, capacity, 
and extent of devolution from the federal to provincial level. The reforms need to first 
identify their current state, from public irrigation departments down to the Farmers’ 
Organizations (FOs) and Water User Associations (WUAs), which will help clarify the roles 
and mandate of each authority and outline a devolution plan for each area where devolution 
has not occurred (such as the public irrigation and drainage authority still managing public 
irrigation departments). For entities that require capacity building and management reform 
(such as FOs), budgets to train and support personnel are needed. 
 
103. To promote trade and agricultural diversification, the trade regime must be 
simplified. This will require removing unpredictable and discretionary instruments like the 
SROs, shifting to a lower set of uniform tariffs, and simplifying the trade regime by removing 
alternative trade policy instruments like export taxes. These three measures would reduce 
uncertainty, volatility, and the policy bias against agricultural products like rice and sugar. 
Valdes et al. (2012) also point out that equalizing tariffs across agricultural products, while 
necessary, is not sufficient for equal effective protection across products, because protection 
or support in the input markets could still be substantial, at varying levels. Their study 
argues that the best approach to reducing the variation in effective protection across outputs 
is to also reduce the variation in protection of all inputs, including raw materials, capital, and 
tradable inputs. From a practical perspective, the measures will require a realistic timetable, 
as well as instruments compliant with the World Trade Organization that may still be able to 
protect national interests. 
 
104. To improve domestic trade of agricultural products while protecting food security, 
distortions in domestic markets of commodities like wheat need to be removed. The simplest 
set of reforms would be to reduce the wheat procurement volume while designing and 
implementing complementary social safety net programs. The wheat procurement 
contraction would reduce the effective subsidy to wheat producers and thus the fiscal 
burden. If food price stability is important, price bands can be implemented using rules-
based adjustable tariffs that set floor and ceiling prices to follow world prices19. In parallel, 
social safety net programs that target food-insecure groups can be established, with clearly 
defined triggers and graduation requirements. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
19
 Valdes et al.  (2012) suggest this approach for wheat and sugar, based on the moving averages of border prices. By keeping the basis of 
the price band delinked from domestic prices, the policy remains a World Trade Organization–compliant instrument as a variable levy. 
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POLICY MATRIX 
Objective Short Run Action (<1 year) Medium/Long Run Action 
Improve agricultural productivity Initiate reform of the national 
agricultural research system to 
make it more efficient and 
effective 
Develop plan for building scientific 
research capacity 
 
Carry out reforms of national 
agricultural research system 
(clarify mandate, shift personnel 
from federal to provincial 
institutions, shift budget, provide 
appropriate performance 
incentives) 
Increase budget for agricultural 
research 
Plan and implement long run 
capacity building program for 
scientific research capacity 
Improve water use efficiency Identify mechanisms for 
institutional reform of the 
management system: 
 Complete devolution of 
authority to the relevant scale 
(including provincial 
authorities and farmers’ 
organizations) 
 Clarify the roles and mandates 
of each authority 
Implement institutional reform 
Provide sufficient federal and 
provincial resources for transition 
and capacity building  
Set up third party watchdog to 
evaluate state of institutional 
reform and monitor for rent 
seeking behavior 
Remove protection variability and 
bias against agricultural exports 
 
 
Identify timetable for removal of 
statutory regulator orders, tariff 
reduction and harmonization, and 
export barrier removal. 
Identify WTO compliant 
instruments that may be 
appropriate to use instead, e.g.  
special safeguard mechanisms 
Remove statutory regulator 
orders, reduce and harmonize 
tariffs, and dismantle export 
barriers. 
Reduce distortions in domestic 
grains markets while protecting 
food security 
Identify minimum volume of public 
wheat procurement, accounting 
(federal and provincial 
procurement programs). 
Identify floor and ceiling prices to 
follow world prices for wheat 
prices 
Identify food insecure groups for 
social protection programs 
Implement rules-based adjustable 
tariffs to maintain designated price 
bands 
Develop and roll out social 
protection programs for food 
security, with clear triggers and 
graduation requirements. 
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